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II Jornadas de Timor da UP

TIMOR-LESTE E O QUADRO GEOPOLITICO MUNDIAL

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EAST TIMOR: SCENARIOS FOR THE NINETEEN NINETIES

by

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This discussion paper is taken from a draft chapter of a book, War Without End: the Hidden History of East Timor, which I am completing. Please do not quote from it without the author's permission.

What, then, of the future? How is the conflict in East Timor likely to develop over the coming decade?

A number of scenarios are possible, each of which can be assessed in the light of recent trends.

Firstly, there is the possibility of an Indonesian military victory over Fretilin. The Indonesian armed forces concentrate their military might in a final onslaught on Fretilin strongholds in the eastern and southeastern zones. Combining fence-of-legs operations with intensive aerial and naval bombardment, they capture or eliminate the Fretilin leadership, destroy the movement's base areas, and run to ground surviving groups. Publicising this defeat internationally, Indonesian diplomats insist that the East Timor issue be brought back to the United Nations General Assembly, in which an even weaker resolution than the one carried narrowly in 1983 is defeated. Despite attempts by non-governmental organisations, supported by Portuguese diplomacy, criticisms of Indonesia's annexation in international human rights forums begin to fade away. The issue can no longer be raised in any meaningful sense within the Non-Aligned Movement, and governments previously critical of the Indonesian stance are forced to accept grudgingly that resistance finally has been quelled. Reluctantly, Portugal is persuaded to accept a negotiated settlement with Indonesia, in which integration is recognised, with guarantees for a respecting of human rights and Timorese 'cultural identity'. Meanwhile, in East Timor, the military press ahead with a token Timorisation of the administration, with Javanese effectively holding power. Support for this administration is bolstered by the creation of pro-Indonesian political groups, possibly based on the former Apodeti party, which provide a counter to any potential criticism -however limited- from members of the Provincial Parliament in Dili, and notably Governor Carrascalao and his former UDT allies. Church opposition is neutralised by the Vatican agreeing to the transfer of Bishop Belo and the removal of priests who have acted as mediators between the Indonesian army and Fretilin groups. With the most minimal of changes in its policies and system of military control, the Indonesian Government is thus able to undermine potential bases for opposition to its continuing occupation, and to remove the issue of East Timor from the international agenda.

What are the chances of this occurring?

Under present circumstances it would seem fairly unlikely. The Indonesian military have undertaken many concerted campaigns with the stated aim of eliminating Fretilin, but none of them have succeeeded -even if the 1978 campaign came close to it. The difficulties for the Indonesian army of

fighting in East Timor's terrain, the ease with which Fretilin groups can conceal themselves in their mobile base areas, and the strength of their support amongst the population, will continue to make an outright military victory unlikely. Furthermore, it has become clear during the course of the occupation -and particularly during the nineteen eighties- that entrenched interests in the Indonesian Armed Forces are quite happy for the conflict to continue at its present low-intensity level. It provides troops with combat practice and enables commanders to gain promotion through their military achievements in engaging and capturing Fretilin brigades, and controlling dissent. Indeed, many of Indonesia's current military leaders earned their stripes as a result of their 'successes' in East Timor. In addition, many members of the Armed Forces have benefited financially from the activities of companies like P.T. Denok, in addition to their profits from daily corruption and bribery. For such people, the adverse diplomatic results of Indonesia's rapacious colonialism are of secondary concern. This, together with the ability of Fretilin to continue fighting, means that an outright victory by the Indonesian Armed Forces is unlikely in the forseeable future.

Similarly -turning to a secong scenario- it is unlikely that Fretilin forces will be able to defeat Indonesia militarily. Estimates of Fretilin's current strength vary considerably, but a reasonable figure seems to be around 2,000 active troops, located mostly in the eastern and southern zones, armed with weapons captured from the Indonesians. Although Fretilin has strong support from networks in the towns and villages, it is clearly impossible for it to mount an offensive which could seriously challenge Indonesian military control. Indeed, the number of engagements with Indonesian troops dropped significantly in the late eighties, and it seems that much of Fretilin's energies are now being devoted to maintaining their base areas -cultivating crops, hunting for food, and providing sdequate shelter. The only developments which might enable Fretilin to make a breakthrough militarily would be either a significant upsurge by separatist movements in areas of Eastern Indonesia, such as West Irian, or a prolonged conflict between military factions in Java itself, related to a succession crisis to Suharto's Presidency. Neither of these seem likely in the immediate future. Consequently, it seems likely that, militarily, the stalemate will continue, with Indonesia maintaining its campaign of attrition against Fretlin groups who sporadically harrass Indonesian units as they move around the territory.

A Third possible scenario is that of the Indonesian Government organising a referendum in East Timor, whose carefully orchestrated outcome would be a vote for integration. Indonesia has previously stage-managed such an event in West Irian in 1969, when -under United Nations auspices, but using Indonesian personnel- the military orchestrated an 'Act of Free Choice', in which 'local representatives' organised in regional councils 'consulted' their populations and then, following discussions among themselves and with Indonesian Government representatives, decided to remain within the Indonesian Republic[1].

Such an outcome in East Timor could be used to legitimise integration internationally, particularly if the military could secure limited U.N. involvement or, even better, a Portuguese presence during the referendum. To a certain extent, Indonesia has already floated this suggestion, both in 1982 and in 1987, when it was argued by government officials that the results of the elections for East Timor's Provincial Assembly gave some guide to the level of support for integration.

What is the likelihood of this taking place?

Several factors currently mediate against it. Most seriously, perhaps, is the point that Suharto and his immediate entourage seem to be opposed to it, arguing that it would entail a greater opening up of East Timor, and enable opposition -and particularly the cathqlic church- to give full vent to its criticisms of the occupation. They cite the events surrounding the Pope's visit in October 1989 as a small scale example of what could happen. Furthermore, since the international community is by now well aware of the methods used by the military to secure the West Irian result, many governments would be unhappy accepting the outcome of a referendum, whilst others would re-open the West Irian case as a means of criticising Indonesia. Consequently, from the present regime's viewpoint, a referendum might bring unwelcome intrusions into East Timor and provoke unwanted international criticism. Since, in addition, no foreign government or international agency is likely to put forward such a suggestion, its chances of emerging as a serious or viable way out of the present situation are rather remote.

A fourth scenario might be a variation of what the Indonesian officers involved in negotiating the 1983 ceasefire termed the "Sulawesi Solution". This would begin with a negotiated ceasefire, followed by a more prolonged agreement, demarcating Indonesian and Fretilin-held zones. As in 1983, Fretilin troops and their families would be allowed to enter Indonesian-held areas, primarily to get access to medical facilities. The Indonesians would take the

the opportunity offered by the ceasefire period to discuss with Fretilin and church leaders a series of measures whose enactment would result in an East Timorese province integrated into the Indonesian Republic, but with a limited degree of ~~autonomy~~ political autonomy. These proposals include would a Timorisation of the administration, with some powers devolved to Dili's Regional Assembly -to direct areas of the economy, to oversee the implementation of regional plans, to suggest policies for maintaining East Timorese culture, an so on. They would also entail a substantial increase in educational provision for East Timorese, in order to build up a corps of ~~train~~ trained workers for both the local economy and bureaucracy. Fretilin members would be offered an amnesty, with the longer term possibility of participation in the Dili government. The introduction of these policies would be accompanied by a limited military withdrawal, campaigns to deter human rights abuse, and a general 'winning over of hearts and minds' approach adopted by the armed forces.

Under present circumstances, such developments seem rather remote. There is little sign of any lessening of Indonesian brutality, or of any serious intention to involve East Timorese in the running of the political system or the organisation of the economy. The 1983 ceasefire agreement was revoked by a military heirarchy whose members remain in predominant positions in Indonesian politics, and subsequent attempts at local cease-fires -arranged through church intermediaries- have collapsed before they have even begun to be implemented. Whilst Fretilin would probably welcome a cease-fire, as they did in 1983 when they were able to re-group their forces, their leaders have made it clear on several occasions that they have little interest in any proposals ~~that offer from the present Indonesian regime offering~~ for a federal solution which are put forward by the present regime in power in Jakarta.

~~The~~

The scenarios suggested thus far have focused on potential developments within Indonesia and East Timor. It is conceivable, of course, that changes could also be brought about by influence or pressure from foreign governments and the international community. These would probably involve the former colonial power, which brings us to a further possibility.

With the exception of a small number of governments, there have been few sustained criticisms of Indonesia's occupation since the invasion. Due

largely to the work of committed diplomats, and to Fretilin's representatives in New York -, the issue has been kept alive in the United Nations -but only just. Much the same has occurred in other forums, such as the Non-Aligned Movement. Within the international human rights network, various Non-Governmental Organisations have succeeded in keeping East Timor on the agenda of bodies such as the U.N.Human Rights Commission. In terms of pressure on the Indonesian regime, this has produced regular diplomatic embarassment, and much time and money has been spent by Indonesia in containing criticisms internationally. Indonesia's status as a co-founder of the Non-Aligned Movement has been damaged by its actions in East Timor. Yet, international pressure of this kind, although successful in its own terms, is limited in scope. It can never constitute a serious threat, nor provide any basis for sanctionning Indonesia in any serious way. As we have seen, this could only be achieved by the governments of countries such as The United States, Australia and Japan, and only then in the months leading up to and after the invasion. It is unlikely that they will apply any pressure on Indonesia to reverse the process of integration or to lessen the brutalities of its impact, unless there is a major political change within Indonesia itself.

Many governments, and notably those of the European Community, might well have responded to Indonesia's diplomatic overtures in the early eighties, had it not been for their relations with Portugal, whose actions have tempered Europe's support for Indonesia, resulting for example in the development of a common abstentionist policy on the East Timor issue at the United Nations. In the coming years, Portugal undoubtedly will remain an important influence on the East Timor issue in the international arena. If it continues with its present policies, then its diplomatic pressure on Indonesia, particularly through the European Community, will help keep the issue alive internationally. It is conceivable, of course, that Portuguese policy might return to its earlier acquiescence and lethargy on East Timor, with the result that Indonesia would be able to secure concessions from the former colonial power. In such a scenario, Portugal, reluctantly accepting <u>de facto</u> integration would conclude an agreement with Indonesia which accepts the <u>fait accompli</u>, but secures guarantees from the military to respect human rights, permit religious freedom, and preserve East Timor's cultural identity. Portugal would then claim that it had done the best it could under difficult circumstances, and had withdrawn in as 'principled' a manner as possible. This would then be supported by other European Community governments, who would join with the majority of governments in removing East Timor from the U.N.agenda. This would make it extremely difficult for Non-Governmental Organisations to raise the issue in any

serious way in U.N.Human Rights organisations. In East Timor the military would simply carry on as normal, exercising control with even less concern for international reaction than previously.

Currently, this outcome seems far less likely than it did in the early eighties, since the Portuguese Government has repeatedly stated the necessity for an act of self-determination. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that this stand taken by Portugal has depended primarily upon the commitment of a number of leading politicians -notably Presidents Eanes and Soares- and that, throughout the eighties, one can find counter statements by other political leaders. Consequently, there is always the possibility that Portugal will exit by taking the 'honourable' route. For the moment, however, Portuguese policy probably constitutes the most effective thorn in the side of Indonesian diplomacy -through raising the issue in international forums and embarassing Indonesia in its dealings with the European Community through such bodies as the Association of South-East Asian Nations(ASEAN).

Changes in Indonesia

In drawing up these scenarios, we have assumed that the present regime remains in place in Jakarta. Clearly, if this were to change, it could have a profound effect on the conflict. Scenarios which we have assessed as unlikely -notably the referendum and the 'Sulawesi Solution'- might well become possible. If this happened, then, obviously the international picture would also change. But what are the chances of a change of regime in Indonesia? Can a government emerge which might be less oppressive towards East Timor, allowing its people a greater say in the running of their affairs, and perhaps even granting some degree of political autonomy?

The issue dominating politics in Indonesia in the early nineteen nineties will be the succession to the Suharto Presidency. In other South East Asian states a change of presidency might not be that fundamental an issue, but in Indonesia's case, its impact could be profound. Suharto and his entourage have exercised a rigorous and tight system of control over Indonesian politics for twenty-five years. They have overseen the destruction of political parties and the creation and maintenance of an authoritarian state whose influence has extended to the remotest village level. Militarily, Suharto has skilfully played off one armed forces faction against another in maintaining his rule. Politically, his cadres have remoulded political parties in the military image, whilst at the same time re-structuring the apparatus of government to ensure an in-built majority for the military. Economically, the President has similarly

built up a ~~centralised~~ system of centralised control, in which his family plays a predominant role, with assets greater than those of the late President Marcos of the Philippines. Major strategic industries in areas such as oil, gas, communications and plantations are run by state companies controlled by Suharto loyalists. Alongside these state companies, and linked with them, are private companies owned by the Suharto family or its close associates. As the Asian Wall Street Journal put it, referring to his more immediate family, "In recent years the Suharto sons(of which there are three)have put together a maze of businesses giving them a stake in almost every important commodity or service in the country. In most cases these businesses originate from and thrive on state contracts, government decrees or licences giving concerns tied to the Suharto sons and their associates special rights to handle the import, manufacture or distribution of such goods or services"[2]. Current estimates of Suharto's family and business associates' wealth in the nineteen eighties vary from two to three billion U.S.dollars.[3]

For a growing number of influential military and political groupings in Indonesia, ~~it is clear that~~ Suharto's rule is increasingly becoming counter-productive. His entourage's handling of the economy, and ~~their~~ involvement in extensive corruption, together with the failure of his government to modernise resource-rich Indonesia at a rate similar to neighbouring countries such as Thailand and Malaysia, has led to demands from within the military both for changes in the political system and, by implication, for the President's retirement at the end of his current term, in 1993. During the eighties it has become more and more apparent to such groups that Indonesia faces urgent problems in its development which the present government seems incapable of addressing. Despite its tremendous potential, the Indonesian economy is burdened with high levels of debt-servicing, its growth relative to other ASEAN states is low, and its attempt to modernise through restructuring its industrial base -established largely in the nineteen fifties- has made little progress in the nineteen eighties. Furthermore, many of the present government's economic policies are having highly adverse cultural and social effects on the population in a growing number of regions in the archipelago. Such factors have meant that in recent years Indonesia has been viewed less favourably as an area for trade and investment. This was brought home most forcibly recently, when the Economist in its annual analysis of the prospects for developing countries, placed Indonesia in the 'high risk' category, three points behind South Africa and six behind El Salvador and Zaire, citing the 'authoritarianism' and 'staleness' of its government.[4] If Indonesia is to change such perceptions, then a number of crucial issues need to be dealt with urgently in the nineties, and in many of these it would seem that the Suharto Government forms part of the problem rather than the solution.

The scale of the problems facing the Indonesian economy can best be illustrated by taking two examples, in the areas of debt and economic growth.

Indonesia's official debt stands at just over U.S.$ 35 billion, and almost forty per cent of foreign exchange earnings have to be used to service this debt annually. The debt-service ratio has increased to this level from 19.75% in 1985 and 32.7% in 1986. Consequently, indebtedness is increasing fairly rapidly, and this is evidenced, for example, in 36.6% of state receipts being allocated to buy foreign currency to repay the country's overseas obligations. The main reason for this lies in the sharp decline in earnings from oil exports due to severe price falls since the end of 1985. However, it also reflects a longer-term trend, namely that if Indonesia is to increase its growth rate, it will have to boost its non-petroleum exports, since the latter currently provide around 70% of export revenue. This means that the country's manufacturing base will have to be diversified, and that in order to achieve this, more domestic and overseas investment is required fairly rapidly. Most commentators -and notably such bodies as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund- have stressed this point repeatedly in recent years, and have underlined the urgency of diversification if Indonesia is not to fall further behind neighbouring ASEAN economies in the nineteen nineties.

Thus far, however, policies to attract increased investment and to promote industrial diversification have had only limited success. Measures such as devaluing the rupiah, providing incentives for export companies, and the doubling of the number of economic sectors open to foreign investment, have not yet resulted in substantial increases in investment or any substantial diversification. Perhaps this is because for many potential investors there seems to be a failure to tackle fundamental problems, which centre on the nature of control over leading economic sectors, and more particularly, on what economic commentators have aptly described as "restrictive licensing and other valuable concessions which favour certain individuals but disadvantage the economy as a whole"[5]. This is a rather thinly veiled reference both to the widespread corruption resulting from the corporate power exercised by the Suharto group in the commodity export sector, and to the restrictions it has placed on companies trying to enter manufacturing and importing sectors where the group has immensely profitable monopolies.

For the future development of the economy, it is crucial that these restrictions be weakened, and that deregulation involve the dismantling of the economic power of the Suharto monopolies. Investors are deterred both by the corruption at every level of business, and by the snail's pace of the government in shifting resources from Suharto-dominated sectors

(~~particularly in import-substituting industries~~) to new manufacturing industries and export-oriented production. Such delays have a negative impact on growth potential, and contribute little to increasing foreign exchange earnings to alleviate the debt problem. Hence the need for austerity measures and substantial cuts in public expenditure budgets in the late eighties.

These trends seem to indicate that we are witnessing a growing conflict between the increasing needs of the Indonesian economy for modernisation based upon deregulation and diversification, and the entrenched interests of monopolies supported and sponsored by companies aligned with the Suharto family. Given present trends, ~~it would seem that~~ this conflict needs to be resolved in favour of economic diversification if the Indonesian economy is to attain the levels of development currently reached by less well ~~xxxxxxxx~~ placed economies in the South East Asian region.

Indonesia similarly faces serious environmental problems, whose impact will intensify during the next ten years. In addition to petroleum and its related products, Indonesia has for many years exported other primary commodities, a wide range of raw materials, coffee, rubber, and, increasingly ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ since the nineteen sixties, timber, which now provides 14.4% of the country's non-oil exports, earning U.S.$ 1.6 billion per year. Ten per cent of the world's tropical forests are located in Indonesia, comprising some ninety million hectares of land. On average during the eighties one million hectares have been felled each year. Most of this has not been replaced, which ~~xxxxxxx~~ is indicative of the government's cavalier attitude to forestry management. Most logging operations leave behind huge quantities of organic waste, which are highly combustible. A fire in East Kalimantan in 1982-3 burnt down 3.6 million hectares of tropical forest -an area slightly larger than the Netherlands. ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ Cutting has resulted in the destruction of the forest canopy and the exposure of the forest soils to the tropical sun. This leeches the soil of its nutrients and, together with erosion, makes any natural regeneration impossible. Both the micro-climate of areas such as Kalimantan and the macro-climate of Eastern Indonesia are beginning to be effected by the current rapacious rates of timber exploitation.[6] Furthermore, forestry exploitation in several areas has robbed indigenous peoples of their homelands -the Kubu in Sumatra, the Penan in Kalimantan, and perhaps most importantly the Korowai in West Irian. These societies, who have lived for centuries by shifting cultivation and hunting and gathering, are ~~xxx~~ increasingly threatened.

The Indonesian Government's treatment of its forested environment cannot be discussed without also mentioning the related ~~xxxxxx~~ issue of transmigration. Policies in this area ~~xxxxxx~~ aim to move millions of landless poor from the central islands of Java, Madura, ~~xxx~~ Bali and Lombok to the less densely populated

islands -mostly in the east. Despite the stated aim of this movement, to reduce population pressure, much of it seems to be occurring largely for security reasons. As General Murdani stated, "The population of sites and the removal of obstacles to land availability need to be given special focus because the choice of locations is related to the concept of territorial management".[7] Transmigration has involved widespread human rights abuses, including forced resettlement, as has been rigorously documented by many commentators.[8] The government has made it clear that an additional aim is to undermine non-Javanese societies and cultures. Hosting a meeting on transmigration in Jakarta, Minister of Transmigration, General Martono, promised that, "by way of transmigration, we will try to realise what has been pledged, to integrate all ethnic groups into one nation, the Indonesian nation. The different ethnic groups will in the long run disappear because of integration, and there will be one kind of man".[9] Current estimates for the period covering the present Five-Year Plan put the loss of tropical rain forest resulting from the clearing of transmigration sites at 3.3 million hectares. In addition, many transmigration sites have proved totally unsuitable for farming, and their settlers have abandoned them for surrounding areas thereby causing further deforestation.

The Indonesian Government's handling of the environment, its transmigration policies, and its treatment of its minority peoples have all led in recent years to a growing opposition, both domestically and internationally. In Indonesia itself, many Non-Governmental Organisations have been campaigning on these issues in the nineteen eighties, and a whole range of international bodies have raised them as urgent priorities, claiming that unless Indonesia alters its policies it will face regional unrest and -in the longer term- ecological disaster.

The government has countered these criticisms aggressively. An advertisement costing U.S.$46,000 placed in the New York Times attacked environmental groups "who want Indonesia managed as one big protected park", whilst the blame for deforestation has been placed firmly on shifting cultivators or on transmigrants, who the minister of transmigration was reported to have described as "mentally unprepared(tidak siap mental)" for life in their new settlements.[10] Conservationists have been described as belonging to "a movement supported and financed by our competitors, because they feel threatened by our expanding exports", according to the Chairman of Indonesia's Timber Cartel.[11]

Much of the tone of this response has been influenced strongly by the views of Suharto himself, who, through family members such as his eldest son, Sigit

Harjoyudanto, and his long-time business associate, Bob Hasan, exercises extensive control over the timber industry. Hasan, a lifelong friend, is one of Suharto's small group of financial and economic advisers. He chairs all the organisations involved in forestry, and notably the Plywood/Woodpanel Association, which sets prices and quotas, and is the only organisation which can issue export licences. As with Suharto in recent years. "Hasan accepts no consultation. He thinks he is doing the right thing".[12] With a mandate from the President, he singly exercises decisive control over the future of Indonesia's tropical forests. Like Suharto, he seems determined to press ahead with forestry exploitation, with scant concern for environmental consequences.

As was the case with economic policy, so too with environmental issues such as forestry exploitation, we have a government in power which, due to its centralising and monopolising role, seems unable to address crucial issues facing Indonesia's development. Other economic and social areas, equally as serious, could have been analysed, and similar trends would have been observed. Overall, it seems that the Suharto regime remains largely an authoritarian system, impervious to demands for greater responsibility and 'openness'(keterbukaan) ~~which should indicate possible changes in the distribution and use of power~~. Consequently, as Indonesian society shows some signs of an emerging potential for a limted form of political pluralism, the government appears to be responding with a reassertion of its traditional paternalistic notions of 'guided democracy', in which political consensus is reached through government guidance and which, in reality, is imposed from above through the direct use of state power. Recent years have seen, for example, a tremendous increase in the activities of Non-Governmental Organisations. Since both Parliament and political parties have been emasculated by the military, political activities have shifted to these organisations, many of which have become local bases for voicing criticisms of the government. Similarly, there has been some discussion amongst academics and even in the Parliament itself on the 'opening up'of the political system. Suharto's model of consensus has been confronted with an alternative model of decision-making through majority voting, with the existence of an opposition. Suharto and his military entourage have tried to silence these criticisms, and, of course, the Non-Governmental Organisations' movement has been strongly attacked, with its activities being castigated as "reprehensible for the development of the nation".[13] Despite such criticisms, the extensive NGO network will not go away, nor will the criticisms from academic, intellectual and dissident political groups. Indeed, the grounds for dissent will recur, as the government's reluctance to give up some of its powers in the interests of economic and political development results in policies disadvantaging significant sections of the population.

In this context, it is quite probable that Suharto will not be elected to his sixth presidency. Indeed, he himself has indicated in his autobiography that he might step down in 1993[2]. Indonesian politics will thus face a succession problem in the nineteen nineties, particularly since Suharto has not succeeded in grooming an acceptable successor to his rule from within his entourage.

What, then, might be possible alternatives to Suharto?

In the late nineteen seventies, a number of dissenting factions within the armed forces argued that the army's role in civilian affairs had become far too great -that it had extended itself economically, politically and socially, becoming bureaucratised, unprofessional, and corrupt. Before the removal of its leading exponents, the leading faction, known as the 'Hankam' group of generals (so-called because its base was in the Department of Defence and Security), put forward the notion that the army should be the 'guarantors' of the political system, rather than running it directly. Their role should be to oversee political decision-making, whilst themselves remaining in the barracks, only intervening to 'restore order' if the political system was threatened.-operating the 'Turkish Model', as one commentator termed it.[17]

Recently such views have again been expressed, but this time by a newer, younger generation of generals, most of whom graduated from military academies in the early sixties. Overall, they seem to be more concerned with their status as professional soldiers, and would prefer a greater involvement by civilians in government, and notably in local government. They are typified by generals such as Rudini, who played a prominent role in presenting the case for the 'opening up' of East Timor at the end of 1988. For this generation -although they will not yet state it publicly- the policies of Suharto and his managers are becoming problematic, if not counter-productive, when faced with the issues Indonesia must address in the nineties. Consequently, the President should either retire or step down, to be replaced by a more civilian-influenced regime, if Indonesia is to modernise in line with other ASEAN states.

Such a scenario may seem rather far-fetched under current circumstances, when Suharto is still able to command overwhelming support in controlling any opposition[18], but, given his reluctance to restructure the economy in any serious manner, and his unwillingness to ameliorate the exploitative effects of his policies on the environment and in areas such as transmigration, there seems little doubt that opposition will recur.

In such a situation it is quite possible that the present form of government in Indonesia could be replaced by one with limited xxxxxxx, but xxxxxxxx genuine civilian representation, whose economic policies might involve a xxxxxxx serious deregulation of the economy and a weakening of the power of state corporations. Combined with such changes, and facilitaing the development of a more export-oriented economic structure, there would probably be attempts to reduce expenditure on high-cost military ventures, and to develop a more professional army -less corrupt, less wasteful of resources. Such a regime might also attempt to improve Indonesia's tarnished international image by alleviating some of the more rapacious aspects of its policies towards areas outside Java.

What policies might such a government follow towards East Timor?

With the aims of improving Indonesia's image, weakening the control of Suharto-sponsored monopoloies, and limiting excessive expenditure, it might well favour a 'Sulawesi Solution', in which the military would retreat, the army and administration would be 'Timorised', and a limited degree of autonomy be given to East Timor as a province. However, against this should be set the rather obvious point that most of the generals of the early sixties generation who would implement the 'Turkish Model' have gained promotion through their 'battlefield experience' in East Timor. Consequently, there would be great reluctance on their part to admit in any way that the occupation and annexation had been a misadventure. The most that could be conceded would be that the army had been too rapacious , due to its involvement in the economic exploitation of the territory. This could then be attributed to the power of the Suharto xxxxx and Murdani monopolies, which would provide the rationale both for a reduction in their powers and for a civilianisation of the Dili administration.

By such means, a post-Suharto Government of this type might implement xxxx changes in East Timor. The most it could grant, however, would be a very limited degree of autonomy, with a provincial administration having a degree of control over social, cultural, and -perhaps- economic affairs. All this, of course, assumes that such a regime can emerge in Indonesia. At present this seems rather unlikely, but, into the nineties, one can envisage the conditions for its emergence developing.

Whatever the outcome, it seems certain that events in the international arena, or within the Southeast Asian region itself, are unlikely to influence xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx significantly the outcome of the conflict in East Timor during the next decade. International pressure will succeed in keeping

the issue alive, whilst Fretilin forces will probably be able to maintain their areas under fairly adverse conditions, and will occasionally be xx capable of ambushing Indonesian troops and harassing Indonesian positions, in a continuing military stalemate. Opposition from the church and from within the administration will also continue, as will regular outbreaks of spontaneous protest in the main towns and villages. Major changes, however, will only come as a result of political changes in Indonesia itself, where a post-Suharto regime may adopt a less brutal and exploitative policy towards East Timor. The limited degree of autonomy allowed by such a regime might then enable the indepeddence movement to pursue its aims in a situation ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ which is no longer dominated by the dreadful brutality and carnage that has been imposed on the East Timorese people for the last fifteen years.

FOOTNOTES

I. For a description of the events surrounding the 'Act of Free Choice' in West Irian, see Brian May, The Indonesian Tragedy, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, I978, chapter 5, "The United Nations Fiasco".

2. Asian Wall Street Journal, 24th November I986

3. See Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, 7th April I983, Sydney Morning Herald, Australia, IOth April I986, and the Asian Wall Steet Journal, 24th November, I986.

4. For details of this, see the league table of countries published in the Economist, London, 20th December, I986.

5. Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, I6th June I986.

6. Herwasono dan Kuswata Kartawinata, "Dampak Sosial dan Ekologis dari Pembangunan Kehutatan di Indonesia", Diskusi INGI, Jakarta, February I988.

7. Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 8th March I985.

8. See, most notably, The Ecologist, April, I984, "Banking on Disaster Indonesia's Transmigration Problem", London.

9. Proceedings of the meeting between the Indonesian Government's Department of Transmigration and representatives from the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia(unpublished), Jakarta, 20th March I985, section 4:4I

IO Quotation cited in Tapol Bulletin, no.76., July I986, London.

II. Berita Hutan, Jakarta, no.I6, January/February I989.

I2. Far Eastern Economic Review, 6Th April, I989, Hong Kong.

I3. This phrase was reportedly used by a minister in Suharto's cabinet during one of its sessions, on July 5th, I989.

I4. This phrase was first used in reference to the Indonesian military Government under Suharto by David Jenkins, in Suharto And His Generals, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, I984.

I5. For example, in July I989 Suharto was able to replace a number of generals who had spoken in favour of keterbukaan.

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3. See Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, 7th April I983, Sydney Morning Herald, Australia, IOth April I986, and the Asian Wall Steet Journal, 24th November, I986.

4. For details of this, see the league table of countries published in the Economist, London, 20th December, I986.

5. Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, I6th June I986.

6. Herwasono dan Kuswata Kartawinata, "Dampak Sosial dan Ekologis dari Pembangunan Kehutatan di Indonesia", Diskusi INGI, Jakarta, February I988.

7. Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 8th March I985.

8. See, most notably, The Ecologist, April, I984, "Banking on Disaster Indonesia's Transmigration Problem", London.

9. Proceedings of the meeting between the Indonesian Government's Department of Transmigration and representatives from the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia(unpublished), Jakarta, 20th March I985, section 4:4I

IO Quotation cited in Tapol Bulletin, no.76., July I986, London.

II. Berita Hutan, Jakarta, no.I6, January/February I989.

I2. Far Eastern Economic Review, 6th April, I989, Hong Kong.

I3. This phrase was reportedly used by a minister in Suharto's cabinet during one of its sessions, on July 5th, I989.

I4. This phrase was first used in reference to the Indonesian military Government under Suharto by David Jenkins, in Suharto And His Generals, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, I984.

I5. For example, in July I989 Suharto was able to replace a number of generals who had spoken in favour of keterbukaan.